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BUILDING CASTLES MADE OF GLASS- SECURITY ON THE
INTERNET
They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety
deserve neither liberty nor safety.
Benjamin Franklin
I. INTRODUCTION
As the internet, with over 60 million users,' displaces traditional forms of
communication, constitutional issues implicating the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments will need to be resolved. Recent polls demonstrate that the
increase in the number of computers has heightened the public's concern about
privacy issues.2 Ironically, many ardent law enforcement supporters have
lamented that the government is watching as never before.3 Computers, more
specifically the internet, need not infringe the privacy protections Americans
hold so dear. While unfettered access to computer records would indeed stifle
privacy, recent technological advances have made it possible to ensure private
communication over the internet.
Encryption allows internet users to send and receive information in code,
decipherable only by a person with the appropriate "key."4 Legislators have
proposed bans on certain types of encryption programs, and some proposals
mandate unrestricted access to the keys. These proposals would force users of
encryption to leave their keys to private files with law enforcement officials.
In effect, people communicating on the internet would live in a glass house.
For very apparent reasons, those who oppose such proposals cite the liberty and
privacy interests protected by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.
Additionally, the United States District Courts for the Northern District of
California and the Northern District of Ohio have recently decided cases
regarding the use and export of encryption technology.' This comment seeks
to discuss these conflicting decisions, the recent proposals to regulate
encryption, and the resulting Constitutional implications.
1. See Lawrence Freedman, Computers, Viruses and War, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 1998,
at 4 (estimating that up to 70 million people worldwide use the internet).
2. In a Harris Poll published March 16, 1998, in BUSINESS WEEK, 80% of respondents
stated they were very or somewhat concerned that credit card data would be stolen if used
online. See Online Insecurity, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 16, 1998, at 102.
3. See Simon Lazarus, Talking in Code, THE RECORDER, Apr. 1, 1998, at 6.
4. A "key" is a digital formula used to convert ciphertext into plaintext. See Samuel
Lewis, Difficult no more: Encryption sheds its "Bad" Reputation; Point-and-click Security On-
Line, 218 N.Y.L.J. S4 (1997). A key is unique to the recipient and, therefore, communications
can only be read by the proper recipient. See id.
5. See Junger v. Daley, U.S. Secretary of Commerce, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio
1998); See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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Sections II and II consist of a brief historical background of the internet,
and a description of the regulatory framework at issue in the conflicting
decisions. Sections IV and V discuss the conflicting cases and recent
congressional proposals, respectively. Finally, the constitutional implications
are explored in light of the conflicting decisions and congressional proposals.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Internet
In the early 1960s, the Cold War was in full swing, citizens were installing
bomb shelters, and children were taking cover under their desks in preparation
for a nuclear attack. The military decided the United States needed a
communication network that would work even if large portions of the support
network were destroyed or lost.6 The internet was designed under contract
from the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).7 ARPA connected
four universities via computer: UCLA, Stanford, the University of California
Santa Barbara, and the University of Utah.8
Initially, only researchers, mathematicians, engineers, and computer
experts used the intemet.9 In the early 1970s, personal home computers were
not yet available, and the internet system was very complex, even for experts.
The internet began to come of age in the 1970s with the development of
Interface Message Processors.' Subsequently, Bob Kahn at ARPA and Vint
Cerf at Stanford developed Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)," which
allowed remote, diverse computers to communicate with each other. 2
Gradually, commands for e-mail and file transfer protocol became easier
to understand and utilize for people other than physicists, engineers, mathema-
ticians, and computer experts. 13 Eventually more and more people used the
internet, and university libraries updated to electronic catalogues offering their
6. See Barry M. Leiner et al., Internet Society (ISOC) All About the Internet: A Brief
History of the Internet (visited July 29, 1998) <http://www.isoc.org/intemet-history/brief.html>.
7. See Walt Howe, Delphi FAQs: A Brief History of the Internet (visited July 3, 1998)
<http://www.delphi.corn/navnet/faq/history.html>.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Leiner, supra note 6. See also Vint Cerf, A Brief History of the Internet and
Related Networks (visited August 29, 1998) <http://www.simmons.edu/-pomerant-
/techcomp/cerf.html>. The term "internef is attributed to Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn. See Dave
Kristula, The History of the Internet (visited 7/29/98) <http://www.davesite.com/webstation/net-
history.shtml>.
12. See Leiner, supra note 6. See also Cerf, supra note 11.
13. See Leiner, supra note 6. See also Cerf, supra note 11.
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resources to the world. The number of sites at this time remained small, yet
more and more organizations and universities were connecting to the internet. 4
The World Wide Web was a new protocol developed in the early 1990's
by Tim Bemers-Lee and Al Vezza.'5 A graphical browser, Mosaic, developed
by Marc Andreesen simplified the World Wide Web and propelled it to its
current prominence.' 6 Initially, users could not route internet communication
across the country without going through the government-funded network.
However, in the early 1990s, independent commercial networks increased and
made it possible to bypass the government network.'7 In May of 1995, all
internet traffic traveled through independent commercial networks.' 8
Currently, the internet has over 50,000 networks on all continents, with over
30,000 in the United States. 19
B. Encryption
Encryption has been used in many forms throughout history. Almost
everyone from military generals to children has sent coded messages in an
attempt to secure privacy. Many people believe the allied forces were able to
shorten World War II because of their ability to break Japanese and German
codes.2" The export of encryption technology was forbidden after the war, and
encryption was classified as a munition.2' Domestic use was still allowed
because of the very limited practical domestic application. 22 The internet has
now created tremendous demand and abundant uses for encryption technology.
For the internet to realize its full potential, businesses and private individuals
will demand confidential communications. Individuals need to protect credit
card numbers, bank account numbers, and various other confidential informa-
tion. Corporations will need to communicate business plans, transfer currency,
review financial statements, and debate operational guidelines to remote
business units around the globe. Encryption technology allows for this
14. See Walt Howe, Delphi FAQs: A Brief History of the Internet (last updated July 3,
1998) <http://www.delphi.com/navnet/faq/history.html>.
15. See id.
16. See id. Andreesen is also the brains behind Netscape, one of the most successful
graphical browsers to date. See id.
17. See id. Initially, the government funded the supporting structure for the internet. See
id.
18. See Walt Howe, Delphi FA Qs: A Brief History of the Internet (updated July 3, 1998)
<http://www.delphi.com/navnet/faqhistory.html>. AOL, Prodigy, and Compuserve came
online and now account for the overwhelming majority of internet service providers. See id.
19. See Leiner, supra note 6.
20. See Lazarus; supra note 3, at 6.
21. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 6. See also infra Section III.
22. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 6.
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communication or transaction while preventing the unauthorized interception,
viewing, copying, altering, or forging of transmissions.23
Encryption involves the use of algorithms, which instruct a computer to
encrypt plaintext into a coded, unintelligible message called ciphertext.24 Once
converted to ciphertext, the plaintext can only be decrypted to plaintext with
the correct "key" held by the intended recipient.' The two types of encryption
are symmetric and asymmetric.
Symmetric encryption involves use of the same key to encrypt and
decrypt. The disadvantage to symmetric encryption is that the decryption key
has to be disclosed to more than the intended recipient because the same key
is used by the sender and the recipient, which makes it more likely that the key
will fall into a third party's hands.26 Asymmetric encryption heightens security
because the public encryption key is made available to anyone, while only the
recipient holds the private decryption key.27 Through this method, anyone can
use the public key to encrypt a message to the holder of the private key.2"
The software for encryption is available in object code and source code.29
Object code is written in binary code.3" Source code is written in complicated
computer programming language such as Fortran.3' The two codes are, in
essence, instructions for a computer to perform some task.32 They are also
interchangeable; however, a computer cannot execute source code commands
without interpreter software.33
The technological advances in personal computers that can encrypt and
decrypt messages create a problem for the FBI because they may not be able
to crack the code to monitor illegal activity.34 Encryption code is measured in
bits and increases exponentially in strength with each added bit.35 Encryption
23. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
24. See id. Plaintext is a document or message as written by a human. Ciphertext is the
process of transforming plaintext to an unintelligible message. See id.
25. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 54. See also Lazarus, supra note 3, at 6.
26. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 54.
27. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 54. The keys correspond mathematically so that the
communication encrypted by the public key can only be decrypted by the related private key.
See Lewis, supra note 4, at 54. Anyone wishing to communicate with the holder of the private
key uses the public key for that person to encrypt the message. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 54.
28. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 54.
29. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
30. See id. (binary code consists of computer instructions written as l's and O's).
31. Seeid. at 712 & n.3.
32. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
33. See id. Source code is understandable by one proficient in technical computer
programs, and a computer may understand the source code with software that will interpret
source code to object code for the computer. See id. at 712 & n.3.
34. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 6.
35. While 40-bit encryption may take hours to break, 128-bit encryption would take a
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of fifty-six bit length or less can be cracked 36 and exported legally. Any
encryption of greater bit length cannot be exported without a waiver from the
Executive Branch. The Department of Commerce and the FBI are concerned
that the proliferation of encryption will make it more difficult to monitor and
apprehend terrorists, which will threaten the security of the United States.
Ell. ENCRYPTION REGULATION
A. Prior Regulatory Framework
The regulations on encryption initially were the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations ("regulations"),37 which are the implementing regulations for
the Arms Export Control Act ("Act").38 The regulations give the President
authority to control "the import and export of defense articles... and to
provide foreign policy guidance to persons ... involved in the export and
import of such articles., 39 Any item the President designates as a defense
article is a part of the United States Munitions List ("USML"). 40 In order for
someone to import or export an item on the USML, an export license must be
procured.4
The Secretary of State, under authority from an executive order,
promulgated the regulations.42 Section 121.1 lists categories of items covered
by the USML, and includes "cryptographic (including key management)
systems,... components or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy
trillion years to break with current technology according to Netscape's chief scientist. See
Richard R. Mainland, Congress Holds the Key to Encryption Regulation, NAT'L. L.J., Apr. 20,
1998, at Bl6 n.1.
36. If a key is sufficiently short, one intercepting ciphertext can break the code by a brute
force search. This entails attempting every key combination until the plaintext message is
obtained. See COMMITTEE TO STUDY NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 63 (1996). One
can crack encryption software of this length easily, and stronger encryption is readily from
foreign producers. See E-Commerce & Y2K: What's Ahead For Small Business: Hearing
Before the United States Senate Committee on Small Business, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement
of Harris N. Miller, President, Information Technology Association of America). The result will
be that high-tech firms in the United States stand to lose up to $65 billion and numerous jobs.
See id.
37. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (1994).
38. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b) (1996).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
decides which items are licensed. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (1994).
42. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
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or confidentiality of information .... 4 Encryption technology, therefore,
needs a license for import or export because it is listed on the USML. The
regulations do allow for a "commodity jurisdiction procedure" if doubt exists
as to whether an item is covered by the USML."
B. Current Regulatory Framework
The current regulatory framework is slightly different due to Executive
Order 13,026, entitled "Administration of Export Controls on Encryption
Products."45 In November of 1996, President Clinton transferred jurisdiction
of nonmilitary encryption products to the Commerce Department under
authority of the Export Administration Act of 197946 and the Export Adminis-
tration Regulations.47 Encryption items designated as defense articles under the
USML are now listed on the Commerce Control List.48 However, the White
House later clarified the Executive Order by stating that the USML would
continue to list encryption items designed for military application. 49 The
Executive Order contains an admonition that the "export of encryption...
must be controlled because of such software's functional capacity, rather than
because of any possible informational value ... ,"0 These export regulations
are in effect to this day.5
The Bureau of Export Administration ("Bureau"), a division of the
Commerce Department, amended the Export Administration Regulations "by
exercising jurisdiction over, and imposing new combined national security and
foreign policy controls on, certain encryption items that were on the
[USML]." 52 The amended regulations contain a category called "Encryption
Items" defined as "all encryption commodities, software, and technology that
contain encryption features and are subject to the [Export Administration
43. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 XIII(b)(1) (1993).
44. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
45. Exec. Order No. 13,026, 15 C.F.R. 730-74 (1996).
46. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1991).
47. Id. See also 15 C.F.R. § 730 (1997).
48. See Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1293.
49. Encryption items "specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified
for military applications (including command, control and intelligence applications)" remain
on the Regulations and under the jurisdiction of the State Department. See 61 Fed. Reg. 68,633
(1996).
50. See supra note 45.
51. The EAA lapsed in 1994, but the President, under authority of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, extended the regulations, and has done so each year since.
See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
52. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-74 (1996).
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Regulations]."53 Generally, the Bureau must grant a license to export any
Commerce Control List item, though there are a few exceptions.54
The Bureau regulations designate three categories of encryption items.
ECCN 5A002 lists encryption commodities, ECCN 5D002 lists encryption
software, and ECCN 5E002 lists encryption technology. 55 The regulations
define the export of controlled encryption object5 6 and source code" software
as "downloading, or causing the downloading of, such software to locations.
outside the U.S ..... s Thus, someone posting encryption software on the
internet is exporting it.59 Finally, technical assistance regulations were added.
Technical assistance in the development of encryption items to a foreigner
requires a license if the encryption items are controlled domestically under
ECCN 5A002 and 5D002.6 However, the regulation states "that the mere
teaching or discussion of information about cryptography... by itself would
not establish the intent described in this section, even where foreign persons are
present."
6l
In order to export an item on the Commerce Control List, one must
request an ECCN classification from the Bureau.62 An export license is
required for all countries except Canada if an item falls under one of the ECCN
classifications.63 Another exception to the licensing requirement states that a
license for export is not required for encryption source code in printed form,
such as a textbook or journal.' Exceptions also exist for commercial
encryption items, which include mass-market encryption software, key-
recovery software, and non-recovery encryption items up to fifty-six bit key
53. 15 C.F.R. § 772 (1996).
54. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 740-44 (1996).
55. See 15 C.F.R. § 774 (Supp. 11996). The definition of Encryption software (ECCN
5D002) is "[c]omputer programs that provide capability of encryption functions or
confidentiality of information or information systems. Such software includes source code,
object code, applications software, or system software." 15 C.F.R. § 772.
56. Object code is defined as "[a]n equipment executable form of a convenient expression
of one or more processes ("source code" (or source language)) that has been converted by a
programming system." 15 C.F.R. § 772.
57. Source code is defined as "[a] convenient expression of one or more processes that
may be turned by a programming system into equipment executable form." See id.
58. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(9)(B)(ii) (1996).
59. See id. There is an escape clause of sorts because it is not an export over the internet
if the ". . . person making the software available takes precautions adequate to prevent
unauthorized transfer of such code outside the United States." Id. However, anyone with
knowledge of the internet knows that it would be virtually impossible for anyone to verify the
destination of software being downloaded from a remote site.
60. See 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(7)(ii) (1996).
61. 15 C.F.R. § 744.9(a) (1996).
62. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 740-44 (1996).
63. See 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(a) (1996).
64. See t5 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(2) (1997).
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length if there is a commitment to develop recoverable items. 65 Generally, the
exceptions listed relate to items currently available to the public. Conse-
quently, the exceptions would not apply to encryption commodities not
specifically listed and already available to the public.
Currently, any citizen or corporation may use any form or strength of
encryption domestically, and the technology may be distributed domestically.'
A person exporting the technology without a license faces significant criminal
penalties.67 As of January 1997, the limit on key length for export is fifty-six
bits, but only if the company commits to development of a key recovery
system.68 Anyone not committing to a key recovery system cannot export the
encryption products without incurring criminal punishment including
imprisonment.69 Against this backdrop, two significant cases have emerged
which will have a dramatic impact on the future course of encryption
regulations.
IV. CONFLICTING DECISIONS
We are at a fork in the road regarding the future of communication,
commerce, and privacy on the internet. Each path leads to opposite ends of the
same destination. The destination is a time when medical records are stored
and transmitted from physician to physician over internet connections, a time
when banking, paying bills, negotiating contracts, sending electronic mail, and
many other everyday activities are conducted via internet connections. One
path leads us to a secure environment in which encryption technology plays a
role in protecting the liberty and privacy interests firmly established in the
Constitution. The other path leads to a future that enables law enforcement
officials, hackers, and others to monitor medical records, banking information,
energy consumption via electronic billing, and purchasing habits among the
many other factors of everyday life. To date, Congress has not indicated that
it has the desire to deal with the issue of encryption technology. The courts,
65. See 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b)(3) (1996). The regulations, in the author's opinion, contain
what amounts to extortion in not allowing the export of encryption, unless there is a
commitment to develop key recovery.
66. See 22 C.F.R. § 123 (1996).
67. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1996). The violation of the Act carries maximum penalties
of $1,000,000 or up to 10 years in prison, or both. A violation of the EAA is subject to a
$50,000 fine or five times the value of the exports, whichever is greater, or imprisonment up
to five years, or both. See 50 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (1994).
68. Key recovery entails "depositing", or "escrowing", the key with a third party so that
law enforcement officials may have ready access after following standard criminal investigation
procedures. See Rick Henderson, Clipping Encryption; Data Encryption Control, REASON,
May 1998, at 7.
69. See supra note 45.
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therefore, have the role of preserving the liberty and privacy interests of
internet communication, while considering the government's legitimate
concern for monitoring criminal activity.
A. The Bernstein Decision
Daniel J. Bernstein developed an encryption algorithm named "Snuffle."7 °
Bernstein made Snuffle public in two ways: in an academic paper and in a
high-level computer language.7' Both communications revealed the methods
for encryption and decryption. 72 Bernstein requested a classification by the
State Department to determine whether Snuffle, as revealed in source code and
the academic paper, was controlled by the regulations.73 The State Department
classified Snuffle as a defense article that should be listed on the USML and
subject to licensing prior to export.74 Concerned that he would not be able to
teach, discuss, or publish Snuffle with other academicians, Bernstein
challenged the Act and the regulations on the theory that they violate the First
Amendment.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held in Bernstein I, that "source code is speech for purposes of the first
amendment" and that the case presented a colorable constitutional claim.75
Bernstein /! presented the court with the question of whether export-licensing
regulations on encryption violate the First Amendment. 76 The Court concluded
that the licensing system acts "as an unconstitutional prior restraint in violation
of the First Amendment" because it fails to "provide for a time limit on the
licensing decision, for prompt judicial review, and for a duty on the part of the
[State Department] to go to court and defend a denial of a license .. .
Bernstein III presented the question of whether the licensing requirements for
the export of encryption technology constitute an unconstitutional infringement
70. See Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1293 (describing snuffle as a private-key encryption
system).
71. See id.
72. See id. Recall that source code is not readable by a computer without interpreter
software, but once interpreted to a binary system of 0's and 's, the computer can encrypt and
decrypt. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708.
73. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 714.
74. See id. at 713.
75. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1438 (N.D. Cal.
1996). The Bernstein I court was the first ever to hold that source code is speech protected by
the First Amendment. See id.
76. See Bernstein, 945 F. Supp. at 1285.
77. Id. at 1290. It should be noted that the holding in the instant case consists of
correctable defects. The court did not go so far as to say the government could not, under
different circumstances, regulate encryption technology. Id.
1999]
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on speech.78 The defendants argued that a facial challenge to the regulations
did not apply because the encryption software is conduct, not expression.79
The Court did not agree with the defendant's speech/conduct distinction noting
that "while the export of a commercial cryptographic software program may
not be undertaken for expressive reasons, that same activity . . . is often
undertaken by scientists for purely expressive reasons. 80 The nature of a
scientist, academician, and scholar is to teach, publish, and lecture-activities
the government aims to regulate.81
The Bernstein I decision noted that the academic paper on Snuffle
constituted speech of the most protected kind.82 The defendants, citing Texas
v. Johnson,83 argued that there must be a sufficient nexus between the conduct
and expression to constitute First Amendment protection. 4 The claim is that
encryption is functional software not intended to convey any message.
The court could find no difference between computer language and a
foreign languageY Indeed it is difficult to understand a distinction. There are
mathematicians, computer experts, physicists, and other academicians who
readily understand source code. The distinction is that the communication is
to a machine, not a human, to perform certain tasks, which does add a
functional aspect to the software. However, as the court noted, recipes are
functional. An extension of the argument is "once language allows one to
actually do something, like play music or make lasagna, the language is no
longer speech., 86 The ability of one to produce, in other words the functional
aspects of speech, should not transform speech to conduct.
The exceptions for printed materials were particularly intolerable to the
Bernstein III court. The exception distinguished print from electronic
publication in an illogical mannerY.8  The regulations would allow one to
publish Snuffle in a book and distribute it to the far comers of the earth, but
publishing on the internet, or on disk, would require an export license.88
78. See Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1292.
79. See id. at 1304 (citing Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759
(1988)).
80. Id. at 1305.
81. See id.
82. See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1434.
83. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (evaluating the expressive aspects of flag burning in terms of the
intent to convey a message and the likelihood the message will be understood).
84. See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1434.
85. See id. at 1435.
86. Id. at 1436.
87. See id.
88. See id. See also Kam v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
A San Diego software developer asked the State Department whether a license was required to
export a book illustrating encryption algorithms and providing examples. See id. at 3. The
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Granted, the effect of this is to require more skill in reducing published
material in book form to functioning software. Be that as it may, the stated
purpose of the regulations is to protect national security. Those who would
harm the national security of the United States would likely be most willing to
expend the resources to acquire that skill. In effect this is a law punishing the
lawful, while having little or no effect on the lawless. After these rulings,
Professor Bernstein was free to teach, publish, and post his programs for his
students or the public.
B. The Junger Decision
Peter Junger, a law professor at Case Western Reserve University Law
School, maintained a web site with information on classes that he taught, which
included "Computers and the Law.' '8 9 The instant case made its way to the
courts because the plaintiff wanted to post encryption programs in an effort to
explain how they work.90 In compliance with the regulations, the plaintiff
submitted applications for commodity classifications. 9 The Commerce
Department classified four of the five items as ECCN 5D002.92
In Junger v. Daley,93 the plaintiff claimed that the Export Administration
Regulations violate the First Amendment because the licensing requirements
on the export of encryption technology serve as a prior restraint in violation of
the free speech clause of the First Amendment. 9 Additionally, the plaintiff
alleged that the regulations are unconstitutional because they discriminate on
the basis of content by subjecting some encryption software to more stringent
regulations than other encryption software.' The government countered that
the licensing requirements are only intended to restrict the export of the
book is in the public domain and not subject to licensing. See id. However, when Karn asked
whether a computer disk version required a license, he was informed that the disk was subject
to licensing. See id. In the author's opinion, this is a distinction without a difference.
89. SeeJunger, 8 F. Supp. 2dat 713-14.
90. See id. As noted previously, posting to the Internet would be considered exporting for
purposes of the controlling regulations.
91. See id.
92. See id. The first chapter of Junger's textbook was classified as material that could be
exported without a license. Recall ECCN 5D002 allows for encryption of confidential
information and the software includes source code and object code among other things. See
also supra Section III (B).
93. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
94. See id.
95. Seeid. at 718.
96. See id. at 720-21. The regulations discriminate in the following ways: based on media
in that printed forms are exempted; based on the type of software as desktop publishing
software is not regulated; and based on strength because fifty-six bit or less encryption is not
regulated. See id.
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software itself, not the idea of encryption.97 The government requested the
district court to review the regulations as content neutral.98 This request is
inapposite to the stated purpose of the regulations, which is to stop the spread
of software that can encrypt data. The stated purpose of the regulation is
precisely because of the content. However, in the end, the court did view the
regulations as content neutral.99
The court addressed the question as "whether encryption source code is
sufficiently expressive to merit heightened First Amendment protection...
[and] ... whether the [regulations] are a prior restraint on speech subject to
greater First Amendment scrutiny."' The conclusion that the regulations are
constitutional is based on the view that encryption source code is inherently
functional, the regulations are not directed at expressive elements, and the
regulations do not reach academic discussions of software in print form.10'
First, and most important, the court dealt with whether the encryption
source code is sufficiently expressive to merit First Amendment protection.
According to the Ohio District Court, encryption source code is inherently
functional, enabling a computer to do a designated task. 102 The court's theory
is that software is indistinguishable from hardware dedicated to encryption in
that encryption software carries out the function of encrypting.' 3  The
conclusion from this theory is that encryption source code "is exported to
transfer functions, not to communicate ideas."' ' The court quickly dismissed
the Bernstein court's characterization that "language equals protected
speech."'0 5 The operative analysis given for First Amendment protection is
whether something expresses ideas'0 6 Citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin,10 7 the
97. Seeid. at 711.
98. See id. at 710. The test for determining whether a regulation should be reviewed as
content neutral is whether the government adopted the restriction because of the views
expressed. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643, reh "g denied, 512
U.S. 1278 (1994).
99. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 720. The court did not consider that the regulations were
passed to suppress disfavored expression. See id.
100. Id. at 712.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 712.
103. See id.
104. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 716. The court concluded that the exporting of encryption
technology is like an encryption device and the value received is the ability of the function the
source code provides. See id.
105. Id. The court disposes of Bernstein by stating that speech is "not protected simply
because we write it in a language." Id.
106. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 716-17. The court stated that source code is purely
functional in a way that recipes and do-it-yourself manuals are not. See id. at 717 (citing
Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1997)).
107. 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
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Court concluded that "[i]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in
almost every activity... but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity
within the protection of the First Amendment."' '
The question now becomes whether the Export Administration Regula-
tions act as a prior restraint on speech by requiring review prior to publication
and licensing. '9 In order to hold that a licensing law works as a prior restraint
on speech, the speech must "have a close enough nexus to expression, or to
conduct commonly associated with expression, to pose a real and substantial
threat of censorship.""' 0 Again relying on the determination that encryption
source code is purely functional, the law was held constitutional."' The view
espoused was that the expression accompanying the source code and academic
discussions describing the software in print media are not regulated and that the
non-expressive conduct may be regulated as purely functional. "2
The court employed an intermediate level of scrutiny to judge constitu-
tionality."3 The test adopted was that of Ward v. Rock Against Racism 14
which consists of determining whether the government-imposed restrictions are
based on disagreements with the message." 5 If so, the regulations are content
based. If, however, the regulations are implemented without reference to
content, they are deemed content neutral." 6  The court stated that the
regulations are content neutral because they were imposed without reference
to any particular views expressed in the software." 7
108. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 717. See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)
(per curiam). Spence established guidelines for determining if expressive conduct is
"sufficiently imbued with [the] elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First
... Amendment[] .. " Id. at 409. The guidelines are whether there is an intent to convey a
particular message and the likelihood must be great that those who view the message will
understand it. See id. The Junger Court claimed that encryption source code exportation does
not convey a particular message, and that it is designed to be purely functional. See Junger, 8
F. Supp. 2d at 716.
109. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
110. Id. (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988)).
111. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 718. The court did not view encryption as integral to
expression. See id.
112. See id. at 718-19. The non-expressive conduct alluded to here is the encryption
program source code.
113. See id. at 720. The court decision to employ intermediate scrutiny is based on the
view that the regulations are content neutral. See id.
114. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
115. Seeid. at791.
116. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 643.
117. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 720. The government implemented the regulations
precisely because of the expressions contained therein. See id. To get around this, the Junger
Court stated that the regulatory distinction is based on the ability of the software to actually
perform the function of encrypting data. See id. The Court, elaborating on the content neutral
distinction, states that the public flow of information in printed form is not restricted. See id.
As to the distinction between printed form and computerized form on computer disk, the Court
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Finally, the plaintiff alleged that content-based discrimination existed
because different levels of encryption strength were regulated differently."8
The court admitted that the government was indeed discriminating based on
content. The argument in support of such discrimination is that the regulations
are tailored to exports that have long, indecipherable key lengths making them
a greater risk to national security." 9
The application of intermediate scrutiny to determine if content-neutral
regulations pass constitutional muster is elucidated in United States v.
O'Brien. 120 The first prong of the four-part test involves determining if the
government's interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 2' The
court concluded that the regulations do not limit the free exchange of ideas
about encryption, but the government regulates encryption software for the
functional ability.
22
The second prong of the O'Brien test states that the regulation should be
tailored to further an important or substantial government interest. 23 The court
held the important interest prong sufficient because the government's concern
for controlling exports that may harm national security is a legitimate one.'
24
Obviously, without the regulations, producers of encryption software could
export to any person at home or abroad regardless of hostility to the United
States. 1u The court stated that the availability abroad of similarly strong
encryption software does not diminish the government's interest.1
26
The regulations must also be narrowly tailored to further a substantial
governmental interest in order to satisfy the third prong of the O'Brien test.'
27
Quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism,'2 the court explained that a regulation
states that there is a functional difference. See id. In printed form, encryption source code is
descriptive, while on computer disk, encryption source code can direct a computer to perform
a task. See id.
118. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 721. See also 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b)(1)-(2) (1996)
(stating that encryption of low key strength is not covered under the regulations).
119. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 721. (noting that the content discrimination is ancillary
to the discrimination based on functionality, and, therefore, not directed at the content of ideas).
120. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (dealing with symbolic speech upholding conviction of one
who burned his draft card because it frustrated legitimate government interests).
121. See id. See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (stating that a law may
not prohibit specific conduct to reach its expressive elements).
122. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 722 (coming to this conclusion for the same reason it
concluded that the regulations are content neutral--At is the regulation of the function of the
software, not the free exchange of ideas about encryption).
123. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
124. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 721-22.
125. See id. at 722.
126. See id.
127. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
128. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
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must not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government's legitimate interests.' ' 29 This explanation does not say the
regulation must make it harder for someone to express, or achieve, something
in order for it to be narrowly tailored. Yet, that is what the court apparently
relied on when it stated, "[e]ncryption software posted on the internet or on
computer diskette can be converted from source code into workable object
code with a single keystroke." 130 The identical matter, the court conceded
throughout, may be legally exported when published in text format. Therefore,
someone with the technical ability to understand source code on disk has the
same understanding of material in print.
The last prong of O'Brien consists of determining whether the regulations
burden more speech than is necessary to further the government's interests.'
3
'
As a determining fact, the court states that short key encryption needs no
license for export in an attempt to demonstrate that the export controls are
targeted at the specific activity threatening legitimate government interests.1
32
A supporting consideration given by the court was that printed form encryption
is not reached by the regulations. 33 Finally, the court noted that the regulations
leave alternative channels of communication open,134 and therefore satisfy
intermediate scrutiny. 13
5
C. Discussion
Both the Bernstein and Junger cases carry great import for the future of
private communications on the internet. However, both cases leave gaps in the
analysis of encryption software source code. Junger almost wholly discounts
the expressive elements of encryption source code and the content based
discrimination of the government regulations. Bernstein did discuss the
functional aspects of encryption source code, but left many important questions
unanswered. The remainder of this comment will discuss some of the issues
left unresolved and then review the Constitutional implications and proposed
legislative bills.
129. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
130. Id. The effect of this is to make someone put the printed text on disk, which hardly
satisfies the admonition in Ward that the narrowly tailoring requirement is satisfied if the
government's interest would be "achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Ward, 491
U.S. at 799.
131. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
132. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 723.
133. See id.
134. See id. (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 802).
135. See id. The Court stated, "[b]ecause the content neutral export regulations at issue
enable the government to collect vital foreign intelligence, are not directed at a source code's
ideas, and do not burden more speech than necessary, they satisfy intermediate scrutiny." Id.
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The Bernstein court used analogies to music, foreign languages, and do-it-
yourself manuals to discount the functional capacity of encryption source code.
Source code is translated to object code by interpreter software so that it may
instruct a computer to do specific tasks. Some would argue this use is purely
functional. The music analogy is instructive, though not determinative, in that
music contains instructions to a human to perform certain tasks. Similarly, a
recipe is functional in that it is instructive, not expressive. Encryption,
however, contains instructions to a computer and not a human to independently
perform some task. The court does not discuss this distinction. The instruc-
tions are purely functional, focusing on how to develop encryption, not what
rhetoric to use. This purely functional aspect should not transform highly
protected speech to conduct open to regulation. For example, desktop
publishing software could not be restricted in its use in the name of order. The
software would be purely functional, yet the software is indisputably a medium
of expression. These problems will have to be solved as computers permeate
every aspect of our lives.
Copyright law can assist in some fashion. Copyright is the protection of
the expression of ideas. Legal scholars could argue that encryption is the idea
and that source code is the expression of that idea, which is subject to copyright
protection. Assuming that copyright protection is attainable, it remains to be
seen whether that would be enough to conclude source code expression. The
answer remains to be seen.136 The concern with the Bernstein analysis is the
narrow scope, focusing on the nature of source code as language, and,
therefore, speech.
The Junger court's analysis is deficient in regard to encryption source
code as expressive speech, content-based discrimination, and the realities of the
present university environment. The Junger analysis does not acknowledge
that encryption is a course of applied mathematics taught at many universities.
The purpose is to utilize algorithms to create other modes of communication.
The government asserts this is not a language but a function, akin to placing a
letter in an envelope so that no one can get the information. However,
encryption source code is more like a foreign language than a hardware device,
and the Supreme Court has afforded foreign languages protections from
government prohibitions. 37 People familiar with source code and encryption
algorithms can understand and debate the merits of the language. Without the
136. Judge Patel, in Bernstein I, reasoned that encryption expressed in source code
communicates how to make the idea of encryption functional, and, as a result, copyright law
supports source code as a means of expression. See Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. at 1436.
137. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 1995),
vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (concluding that speech in any language is
speech).
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source code, there could be no expression of the idea of encryption. The
regulations restrict the use and teaching of an idea, encryption, in a way that
makes certain expression illegal. Thus, the expression of the idea of encryption
should be afforded heightened First Amendment protection.
The Junger analysis also falls short in concluding the regulations are
content neutral. The government's concern is the recipient's ability to encrypt
data. Clearly, this has functional and content-based implications. The
restriction is imposed precisely because of the content, which allows the
function of encryption. The licensing is aimed at the export of a particular
aspect of a particular computer language. This would seem to fail the test of
Texas v. Johnson in disallowing prohibitions on conduct (exporting) to get to
expression (encryption source code). To simplify matters, the regulations
restrict only algorithms and software associated with encryption, but not other
types. This quintessential content-based restriction is aimed at suppressing the
expression of an idea that the government deems to be dangerous. This aspect
alone should trigger the strongest First Amendment protections; however,
Junger applied the lenient symbolic speech test of O'Brien. The question that
must be answered involves why we would restrict cyberspeech in a way that
we would not restrict other forms of speech. This question implicates a form
of discrimination that requires the more stringent standards of New York Times
Co. v. United States.'38
Finally, Junger does not acknowledge the realities of modem day
universities. The Court states that textual and printed versions of the
encryption source code are not limited by the regulations and, therefore, the
regulations are Constitutional. However, many foreign students attend classes
in the United States. Many professors maintain web sites to post class
information and syllabi. So, Junger does not resolve the plaintiff's dilemma
in that talking to a foreigner about encryption, teaching encryption in a class
with foreigners, or placing problem sets of algorithms on the interet are all
prohibited by the plain language of the regulations. 3 9
These cases, though furthering the debate, are short on comprehensive
analysis of all necessary factors and a realistic view of the current technological
environment. Citizens concerned with liberty and privacy interests are worried
these cases leave too much to chance for future internet communications.
Lobbying and television advertising campaigns have begun to push Congress
to enact strong encryption legislation. The next sections will review some of
the legislative proposals and the Constitutional implications.
138. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (stating that prior restraint of speech is only justified when
disclosure results in direct, immediate, and irreparable harm).
139. See discussion supra Section III.
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V. PROPOSALS
A. Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act, H.R. 695, 105th Cong.
(1998)
One of three major proposals to promote privacy and security on the
Internet, the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE)'" has solid
bi-partisan support in the House of Representatives. 14 1 Many devoted to liberty
and privacy favor this bill for many reasons. First, the bill affirms the freedom
to use or sell the strongest available encryption. 142 Next, the bill defeats any
governmental attempts at mandatory key recovery systems. 143 Finally, the bill
allows American companies to compete with foreign companies in the
encryption market by lifting all export regulations on encryption software.'44
Americans for Computer Privacy, an advocacy group, reports that the bill has
wide support from the financial services industry, the health care industry,
privacy groups, the high-tech community, and both liberal and conservative
think tanks."
4s
B. The E-Privacy Act, S. 2067, 105th Cong. (1998)
The E-Privacy Act"~ is aimed at fostering privacy on the Internet. 147 The
bill is proposed to fulfill eight goals."' First, the bill seeks to preserve the right
to choose the method of protecting private communications and information.149
Most significant to liberty proponents is that the bill also bars government
140. Sponsored by Representatives Bob Goodlatte, a Republican from Virginia, and Zoe
Lofgren, a Democrat from California.
141. See Americans for Computer Privacy, Computer Privacy; Bills in Congress (visited
July 15, 1998) <http://www.computerprivacy.org/bills> (focusing efforts on computer privacy
rights).
142. See Secure Public Networks Act (visited July 15, 1998) <http://thomas.loc.gov /cgi-
bin/query/D?c105:2:./temp-c1O5Az2GTT:e37986>. Section 2802 states in relevant part: "..
. it shall be lawful for any person within any State, and for any United States person in a foreign
country, to use any encryption, regardless of the encryption algorithm selected, encryption key
length chosen, or implementation technique or medium used." Id.
143. See id. Section 2804 states in relevant part: "PROHIBITION-No person in lawful
possession of a key to encrypted information may be required by Federal or State law to
relinquish to another person control of that key." Id.
144. See id.
145. See supra note 141.
146. Sponsored by Senators John Ashcroft and Conrad Bums, Republicans from Missouri
and Montana, respectively, and Senator Patrick Leahy, a Democrat from Vermont.
147. See supra note 141.
148. See Congressional Record Statement (visited July 8, 1998) <http://www.senate.gov/
-leahy/s980512.html>.
149. See id.
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mandated key recovery encryption systems.'50 The third goal establishes both
procedures and standards for law enforcement access to decryption keys for
both encrypted communication and stored electronic data, permitting access
only upon proper authority and procedural safeguards.' Also, the bill
establishes standards and procedures for foreign government access to the
plaintext of encrypted communications.' The last two goals of the bill
concern privacy advocates and are largely the reason for more widespread
support for the SAFE act. The instant proposal seeks to set up a National
Electronic Technology Center (NET Center) to assist law enforcement officials
in researching ways to lawfully monitor encrypted communications under
proper authority.' The final significant goal is to update export controls to
guarantee competition in the global marketplace by American companies that
are now, in effect, shut out."' Due to concerns that the Net Center would
create a new bureaucracy with the potential to infringe liberty, this bill does not
have the widespread support that the SAFE act enjoys. 5
C. The Secure Public Networks Act, S. 909, 105th Cong. (1998)
The last significant proposal, The Secure Public Networks Act, is very
similar to what the Clinton Administration and the FBI have been putting forth
since the inception of this debate.'56 This proposal is very similar in relevant
aspects to the current regulatory scheme. In addition, the bill would require
every American utilizing encryption to deposit a spare key in government-
approved third party accounts. For this reason, liberty and privacy advocates
have not supported this bill.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
One should consider the Congressional proposals and current regulations
in light of their Constitutional implications. Any system of mandatory key
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See supra note 141.
154. See Congressional Record Statement (visited July 8, 1998) <http://www.senate.gov/
-leahy/s9805.html>.
155. See Center for Democracy and Technology, Senators introduce pro-privacy encryption
• . . Administration Position (visited July 10, 1998) <http://www.cdt.org/press/051298
press.htmlh>. The Center for Democracy and Technology believes the provisions may create
new burdens on privacy.
156. Sponsored by Senator John McCain, a Republican from Arizona, and Senators Bob
Kerrey, John Kerry, and Ernest Hollings, Democrats from Nebraska, Massachusetts, and South
Carolina, respectively.
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escrow necessarily implicates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution. The Bernstein and Junger cases analyzed the implications for the
First Amendment to the Constitution, but not to the extent or satisfaction of
advocates on both sides of the debate. The free flow of communication-from
credit card transactions to e-mail critical of government--has been a sensitive
matter for Americans since the inception of our nation.'57 The basic value of
private communication is as important today as it has ever been, and encryption
allows for that private communication. There are costs, however, such as
limiting law enforcement's ability to monitor and evaluate the communications
of dangerous criminals and terrorists. It is understandable that law enforcement
officials would propose mandatory key escrow for easy, immediate access to
internet communications. However, the question is whether law enforcement's
legitimate interest in monitoring terrorists and criminals may justifiably curtail
the liberty and privacy interests of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."'158  The First
Amendment is not absolute, but has been applied to numerous mediums. 1
59
With regard to academics, the Supreme Court has stated that the imposition of
a "straitjacket" on academic leaders in universities imperils the future of the
nation) 6° Of course, some speech may be restricted, such as shouting "fire" in
a crowded theater.' 61  The Supreme Court, however, insists that entire
categories of speech may not be subject to prior restraint or categorically
regulated.' 62 The mandatory key escrow proposals and licensing requirements
contravene these First Amendment principles by placing a ban and prior
restraint on a medium of expression that academics utilize.
157. During the debates on the Constitution, writers used pseudonyms to protect their
identity when conducting public debate through newspapers. See generally The Federalist
Papers.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
159. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (applying first amendment
to broadcasting medium); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948)
(applying first amendment to motion pictures, radio, and newspaper mediums); Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (applying first amendment to leaflets as a medium).
160. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). The Attorney General of
New Hampshire petitioned a state court to propound questions regarding a university lecture
to plaintiff who was held in contempt for repeated failure to answer. See id.
161. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
162. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (stating absent obscenity, extortion or
blackmail, the government is required to prove its case that an instance of speech is likely to
cause sufficient harm to justify the regulation).
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Encryption is a recognized science taught at many universities around the
country. The idea is encryption and the expression of that idea is the
algorithms constituting encryption source code. The argument in Junger is that
encryption is not speech because it is purely functional.163 However, chemical
equations and recipes are purely functional mediums of expression, which are
protected. " The lack of familiarity with a particular language should not, of
itself, strip that language of protections afforded speech. 165 Therefore, source
code, as a form of expression, should be afforded the same protections a
foreign language, recipe, or chemical equation is given. The caveat, carved out
in Brandenburg,'66 is that all expression should be permitted, unless evidence
exists that particular forms of speech cause serious harm. 67
The Junger court accepted the argument proposed by advocates of
encryption regulations that source code is not sufficiently expressive to merit
First Amendment protections. The activities at issue are considered conduct
in the same way that stuffing envelopes with letters, moving one's lips to
speak, or utilizing a printing press to mass produce leaflets are considered
conduct. These are classic cases of mediums of expression falling within the
ambit of the First Amendment. Accepting the expressive conduct contention
would call for application of the more lenient intermediate scrutiny revealed in
O'Brien.168 However, the more recent case of Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official
English'69 asserted that all speech can be viewed as expressive conduct and fall
under intermediate scrutiny. 70 Language, by definition, is speech, and so the
regulation of language is the regulation of speech.'
Accepting the O'Brien test does not necessarily lead us to the same
conclusion that the Junger Court announced. The government argued that the
regulations are aimed not at the expression, but the functional use of encryption
source code. This argument fails to recognize that the unregulated printed form
of expression is every bit as functional to a mathematician as the same
information on computer disk. Similarly, one who cannot distinguish source
code from any other computer language will not be helped by that information
being on disk. It appears that the government wishes to limit the ready
163. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708.
164. See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1435-36.
165. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 936.
166. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444.
167. See id.
168. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367.
169. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9"' Cir. 1995), vacated
on other grounds, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
170. See id. For this reason Yniguez "emphatically reject[ed]" the idea that speaking in a
foreign language is expressive conduct as opposed to pure speech. See id. at 934.
171. Seeid.at935.
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availability of the source code by those who cannot understand the information.
This reasoning finds no support in O'Brien and, therefore, fails this test.
The mandatory key escrow proposals contravene, among other rights, the
right not to speak. Allowing the government unfettered access to secure
communications puts us in a position of being forced to speak against our will.
The government could reveal our identity through mandatory key access while
we engage in constitutionally protected conversations. For example, civil
rights activists cannot be compelled to disclose the identity of members or
authors of protected pamphlets, journals, or commentary. 72 Internet communi-
cations and transactions encrypted by their senders and recipients are encrypted
precisely because they seek to keep their identity and comments anonymous.
The current regulatory scheme, and the proposals maintaining those
systems, also fail the second prong of the O'Brien test. The second prong
requires that the regulation further a significant governmental interest.' 73 The
interest the government puts forth is indeed legitimate and significant. The
analysis, however, turns on whether the regulations further these significant
legitimate interests. The advent of these regulations has seen a dramatic
increase in the availability of encryption products imported from foreign
corporations and exported from foreign countries to our trading partners. 74
The effect of these regulations is to cripple the domestic encryption technology
industry while doing little to improve national security. 7 For this reason, the
Junger analysis should fail the second prong O'Brien by failing to further the
legitimate interest.
The requirement that the "governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression" may be regarded as requiring alternative
channels of communication. 76 Junger, the E-Privacy Act, and the Safe Public
Networks Act fail the third prong of the test. The government repeatedly
asserts that the printed form of source code is not regulated and, therefore, an
alternative channel of communication is available. However, as noted earlier,
posting the software to the internet is a violation of the export regulations. This
one fact causes the analysis in Junger and the congressional proposals
172. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). "Effective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by
remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly." Id.
173. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
174. See E-Commerce & Y2K: What's Ahead For Small Business: Hearing Before the
United States Senate Committee on Small Business, 105' Cong. (1998) (statement of Harris N.
Miller, President, Information Technology Association of America).
175. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
176. See id. at 377. It seems that any regulation suppressing expression that has only one
medium of communication would inextricably tie the governmental interest with the expression
in violation of the Constitution.
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mentioned to fail the third prong of O'Brien. The internet is the only
alternative able to implement the idea and test the efficacy of any algorithm.
The government regulations and current proposals mandating key
recovery have the definite impact of discouraging the open exchange of ideas
on the internet, which should trigger strict scrutiny in any First Amendment
analysis. The internet communicator would, in essence, live in a glass house.
Any proposal, or regulation, that limits key strength is, by definition, content-
based discrimination that carries a heightened level of scrutiny under the First
Amendment.
Finally, the licensing requirements, which are left to the discretion of the
executive branch with no judicial review, work a prior restraint on the free
exercise of First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court expressly stated, in
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 177 that "speech restrictions cannot be
treated as simply another means that the government may use to achieve its
ends."'78 The Supreme Court has also recognized that scientific and academic
research is at the core of First Amendment protections.1 79 It seems apparent
that the gravamen of the argument in favor of encryption restrictions is that
regulating this speech will offer temporary safety. This line of reasoning
should be considered an open invitation to strike the regulations. 80 For the
foregoing reasons, source code should be found to be speech under the First
Amendment, key escrow a violation of rights under the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom to speak or not speak, and licensing requirements a prior
restraint discouraging the free expression of ideas.
B. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
right of all citizens to "be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures."' 8 ' The key recovery proposals
were not a part of the Junger and Bernstein cases, so the focus of this section
is on the Congressional proposals' 82 to mandate key recovery. 183 The Fourth
177. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
178. Id. at 512.
179. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See also Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1991)
("[T]he First Amendment protects scientific expression and debate just as it protects political
and artistic expression.").
180. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (stating, in a commercial speech context,
that the government may not sustain a regulation on commercial speech without demonstrating
that the potential mischief is real and that the regulation will in a particularized way curtail the
mischief to a material degree).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
182. See supra Section V. The Safe and E-Privacy proposals prohibit mandatory key
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Amendment states that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause" and
"particularly describing" the target(s) of the search.'I" However, one of the
proposals, The Secure Public Networks Act, allows law enforcement officials
to obtain the access to your communications with a more general subpoena, as
opposed to a search warrant specifying a particular target for the search. 5
Mandatory key escrow proposals, requiring nothing more than a subpoena
without a particularized search target, would easily lead to dragnet searches
resulting in a significant infringement on the security and privacy of every
individual communicating or transacting business on the intemet"s in violation
of Fourth Amendment protections.
8 7
The Fourth Amendment protections have continually been modified and
extended to address technological advances. In 1967, the Supreme.Court held
that a warrantless wiretap was equivalent to the British rummaging through
eighteenth century papers.' The parallels to secure internet communication
are patently obvious. One speaking on the telephone inside the home has a
reasonable expectation of freedom from warrantless search and seizure.
Similarly, one communicating on the internet does so over the telephone line
from the same home phone with the same reasonable expectation of privacy.
It could be argued that the communication is no different at all than a telephone
conversation and key escrow amounts to a wiretap. If, on the other hand, one
access; however, the Secure Public Networks Act and Executive Office proposals do require
key recovery. See supra Section V.
183. See Richard R. Mainland, Congress Holds the Key to Encryption Regulation, NAT'L
.L.J., Apr. 20, 1998, at B9. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies have argued strongly
that encryption manufacturers require key recovery so that they can penetrate the plaintext
messages without the knowledge of the parties to the communication. See id.
184. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The reason for this amendment is undoubtedly to curtail
dragnet searches that trap numerous innocent citizens in their everyday activities, which would
greatly harm the privacy of lawful citizens. See Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption and
Mandatory Access, 1998: Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Congress (1998) (statement of Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Professor, Stanford Law School).
185. See Secure Public Networks Act, §106(2)(a) (visited July 15, 1998) <http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c105:1 :./temp/-clO5Vfj6fo:e988:>. "A key recovery agent,
whether or not registered by the Secretary under this Act, shall disclose recovery information:
(a) To a government entity if that entity is authorized... or obtained... a subpoena authorized
by Federal or State statute .... " Id.
186. See Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption and Mandatory Access, 1998: Hearings
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 105'
Congress (1998) (statement of Kathleen M. Sullivan, Professor, Stanford Law School).
187. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (invalidating a search warrant authorizing
the search of a home for books, records, and other materials relating to the Communist Party,
on the ground that the warrant authorized law enforcement officials to rifle through and make
discretionary judgments about books and records that is in effect the equivalent of a general
warrant, one of the primary targets of the Fourth Amendment).
188. See supra note 186 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
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argues e-mail is more like a letter, that argument also fails. One who sends a
postcard does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.8 9 However, place
that same postcard in an envelope and there is a reasonable expectation of
freedom from warrantless search and seizure. Courts may easily analogize
encryption software to an envelope's purpose of concealing confidential
contents. Certainly, the government could not restrict the use of gummed
envelopes to facilitate the monitoring of potential domestic or foreign terrorists.
That is the essence of mandatory key recovery proposals, which turn historical
Fourth Amendment presumptions upside down by requiring citizens to assist
law enforcement officers in the surveillance of private communications.'"9
There is no difference between mandating key escrow for encryption software
and mandating key escrow to our homes. Both could be supported by the
argument that national security is at risk, and the government needs ready
access to potential criminal's homes. Similarly, the government could not
outlaw locks, or mandate the escrow of keys to gun cabinets with a third party
to easily track the number of shotguns citizens keep. Suppose our medical
records or bank statements are encrypted on computer diskettes. The IRS
would not be able to demand the keys to our computer files under the authority
of a subpoena without violating the Fourth Amendment. There is no difference
between that and the government requiring us to keep the hard copies of these
records in a government access vault. Suppose the government mandated in
home cameras with the promise that they would not turn them on absent
suspicion of illegal activity.' 9' Again, that does not differ from the monitoring
effectuated by mandatory key escrow. All communications on the internet
under such a proposal amount to living in a glass house. For the internet to
attain its full potential, internet communications must carry the protections
afforded traditional speech.
C. The Fifth Amendment
The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' 92 The
protections offered by this clause consist of a simultaneously testimonial
communication that is incriminating and governmentally compelled. 93 The
189. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (concluding Fourth Amendment does
not preclude law enforcement searches of open areas visible to passers by).
190. See supra note 186.
191. See supra note 186.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
193. See Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption and Mandatory Access, 1998: Hearings
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 105,h
Congress (1998) (statement of Kathleen M. Sullivan, Professor, Stanford Law School).
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Fifth Amendment protections are implicated in that, absent mandated key
recovery, the government would have to compel disclosure of the encryption
key.'" If the encrypted communication is incriminating, then the disclosure of
the key triggers the protection of the Fifth because the government is
compelling access to the incriminating testimonial communication. 9 5
However, mandated key recovery would circumvent the Fifth Amendment
protections. While it is true that the key escrow is compelled, any use of the
key to decrypt incriminating testimonial communication would be voluntary.'96
For example, assume a criminal defendant is using encrypted e-mail to discuss
trial strategy with an attorney. If law enforcement officials use the escrowed
key to decrypt the communication, that could lead to self-incrimination. The
government would compel the escrow of the key, but the communication is not
compelled, and, therefore, presumably would not violate the Fifth Amendment.
On the other hand, if there is no mandatory key recovery and officials compel
the communication, that would violate the Fifth Amendment. The use of this
method to subvert the Fifth Amendment is intolerable to liberty and privacy
advocates.
VII. CONCLUSION
The internet has tremendous potential to improve productivity, facilitate
business transactions, and improve many other aspects of everyday life.
Encryption technology is a way of maintaining the liberty and privacy interests
of the Constitution. The notion that encryption is inherently functional, and
thus conduct, runs counter to the numerous mediums held subject to First
Amendment protections. Business and consumer confidence in the Internet
depends upon privacy protection. To ensure that our nation moves down the
path of liberty to the future of the information age, Congress must pass
legislation to protect security on the internet and lift the existing regulations on
encryption technology. So, Mr. Henry, what say you to Mr. Franklin? Liberty,
or temporary safety?
Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take, but as
for me, give me liberty, or give me death!
Patrick Henry
Joe Baladi
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. Even if the enabling encryption is incriminating to the user, it is not
incriminating testimony by the third party escrow agent holding the key. See id.
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